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Tax Transparency and BEPS 
 
Jeffrey Owens1 
 
The following is a modified version of a keynote speech presented by Professor 
Owens at the Tax Administration Research Centre Workshop, held at the 
University of Exeter, 21-22 April 2015. 
 
We are moving into a new era where the traditional relationships between tax 
administrations, tax advisors and companies are changing: moving away from 
confrontation to cooperation. At the same time, there remains some hope that a 
new consensus will emerge from the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS) project on a revision to the international rules of the tax game. This paper 
explores these issues. 
 
Cooperative Compliance 
 
The concept of cooperative compliance was initially launched in 2008, with a lot 
of help from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), but it was referred to 
by the term, “enhanced relationship”. It would not have been my choice of name 
for this concept. The Dutch and the Koreans refer to it as “horizontal monitoring”. 
I don’t like that either. That gives the suggestion that one party lies down and the 
other party walks over you, which is not what cooperative compliance is about. So 
today we have the term, “cooperative compliance”.  Whilst it is better, I suspect it 
will evolve. The concept is all about a change in the dynamics of the relationship 
between these three key players in the tax world. Moving from a relationship that 
is characterized by reference only to the legal requirements to one where 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) comply with the spirit of the law. You can 
argue what that means in practice, but it isn’t that difficult to determine. You 
move from a relationship that is characterized just by reference to the legal 
obligations and with limited disclosure, with no signals of uncertainty. In other 
words, the taxpayer is not going to ask HMRC, “you know, we’re not quite sure 
this scheme’s going to work. What do you think”? That seems kind of a strange 
thing to ask, but if you have a dialogue it can be done. You try to move away from 
that non-constructive dialogue to a relationship where you have mutual trust; a 
relationship where the taxpayer is prepared to disclose what  they’re doing, it’s 
prepared to help the tax administration to understand their business model, why 
they’re changing it, why they’re undertaking business restructuring. At the same 
time, the tax administration is open with the taxpayer. And that has to start at the 
level of policy formulation, where you have a dialogue with business, you tell 
them what you’re thinking of; at the level of implementation of the policy 
decisions that you make; and in monitoring to ensure that the laws are actually 
implemented in a consistent way. It sounds simple but it’s not easy to achieve.   
 
What does it require if we’re going to move in that direction? The first thing is 
building up trust and, as we all know, it takes a long time to build up trust, 
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particularly in the tax area. On the other hand, you can lose trust very quickly. 
And if you’re going to get this change in culture – because we are talking about a 
culture change here, you may have to also have legislative changes as well to 
make it work.  But essentially it’s cultural change, which has to start at the top. 
The tax Commissioner and his deputies must firmly commit to the programme. 
You also have to have the CEO and the board committed. No MNE should go into 
a cooperative compliance programme unless the board has had a discussion. “Is 
this something we want to do, and do enthusiastically?” But even that is not 
enough. It then has to percolate down to the operational level, and that has been a 
problem, and it’s where the cultural change comes in. Because if the auditors on 
the ground don’t understand that there has been a change in the climate, it’s not 
going to work. The same applies to MNEs. If the people that design the tax 
planning schemes, including the advisors, do not realise that things have changed, 
then they just continue in their old ways, not being afraid to cross the red line of 
acceptability and so cooperative compliance is not going to work.  In practice, 
even for countries like the Netherlands or the UK, it takes a long time for the 
change to percolate down. And that’s where it really is a cultural change; a 
generational change. So be patient. It will take time, but it is worthwhile 
persevering.  
 
The other thing cooperative compliance requires is that tax administrations have 
commercial awareness: that they understand how business operates; and that 
business in turn understands what drives the tax administration. One thing that can 
help here is that many countries are moving to a situation where there’s much 
more of an exchange of personnel between the business sector and the 
government sector. I don’t think we want to get to the US situation, where you 
design schemes; then two years later you are in the private sector and you exploit 
those same schemes. That’s perhaps not where you want to go. But I think having 
more movement of staff between the private sector and the tax administration is a 
positive thing. There are some countries where that is just not accepted. In France, 
for example – if you are a senior tax official and you leave the tax administration, 
it’s a one-way exit; you can’t come back. That’s the wrong approach, in my view 
anyway.  
 
A further issue that has to be addressed in the cooperative compliance space is 
confidentiality. Because when you provide information in the context of the 
cooperative compliance programme, you can’t take it back; you can’t suddenly 
forget it.  So you have to be sure that the tax administration will not exploit it. 
And also, on confidentiality, there is the question of how widely information 
should be shared. Some MNEs may be happy that, say, the UK gives information 
they get under the cooperative compliance programme to the US; they may be far 
less happy if it ends up in Sudan. 
 
Where does this programme of cooperative compliance currently stand? I would 
say that there are probably less than 8 countries that have actually implemented 
true cooperative compliance programmes. There are many other countries that 
say, “we have it”, but it is more rhetoric than reality. They think, “Ah, now we 
have an occasional lunch with a tax director, this is cooperative compliance”. 
That’s not the way it works. Genuine cooperative compliance requires a 
fundamental change in the way the tax administration works, and it requires 
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legislative change, it requires cultural change, it requires a change in the way 
information is handled. This is not something that can be put in place overnight. It 
takes a long time – and it does require resources; significant resources of high-
level staff at the beginning – but once you have it in, it pays for itself.  
 
Where are we going today? It’s difficult. In some ways, cooperative compliance is 
suffering from collateral damage from the BEPS project. There are very few 
Commissioners that are going to be prepared to stand up and say, “I love the 
taxpayer. Let’s sit down and have a nice conversation.” And there are very few 
companies that are prepared to take the risk of being very open in the current 
environment. So we need to know how to kick start this process. Because I 
believe, quite strongly, that many of the issues in the Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting project are going to be much easier to solve if we have this type of 
dialogue. And I think this is not just the case for the OECD countries; it is also the 
case for developing countries. So I hope we can move forward. The WU Global 
Tax Policy Center at the Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law (part of 
WU Vienna University of Economics and Business) has just launched a project on 
cooperative compliance with support from the Tax Administration Research 
Centre (TARC) at the University of Exeter. We aim to get two or three countries 
in Africa and two or three multinationals to volunteer to go into this programme. I 
did this successfully in Russia. At the end of two years’ negotiation, we managed 
to get in place a cooperative compliance programme. There are five multinationals 
in the programme and it seems to be working. If you can do it in Russia, you can 
probably do it anywhere.  
 
BEPS 
 
And now to BEPS; you can’t go to any tax conference these days without using 
the word, “BEPS”. I’m sure you are all familiar with BEPS, so I’ll just give you 
some high-level comments. 
 
Launched in 2013 by the OECD, it is the biggest tax game in town. It poses an 
enormous reputational risk for the OECD; if they don’t succeed in this, they’re 
going to have a problem moving forward on the broader tax agenda. If you want 
to see the first BEPS report, go back to the 1998 report of the OECD on Harmful 
Tax Competition. Almost everything that’s in the BEPS project is there. And 
almost everything that is being worked on in BEPS was being worked on by the 
OECD over the last 20 years: so what’s the difference? There are three 
distinguishing factors. First, BEPS is a package. That was not traditionally the 
way the OECD worked. You looked at a particular issue, isolated it, you had a 
long period of technical discussions, you came up with proposals and within five 
years you had a couple of recommendations. That’s not the way it is happening 
today. All these issues are part of a package. That has its advantages and 
disadvantages.  The advantages: as a package, you can get trade-offs. The 
disadvantages are that you don’t always get the right technical solutions. The 
second distinguishing feature of the BEPS project is the political support. This is 
very much a project that is a top-down rather than bottom-up project. Thirdly, the 
timelines: basically the OECD was given until November 2015 to deliver on the 
15 Action points. That is a very tight deadline. What was pushing it? A lot of 
people say it was the global financial crisis, the need for money. Obviously, those 
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are important drivers. But I think there were also at least two or three other drivers 
that were perhaps equally important. One was this feeling that, if we’re going to 
build up support for exiting from the crisis from citizens – citizens who are seeing 
their benefits cut, and their taxes increase – you must be able to show them that 
everybody is paying their fair share of tax. It is an important political driver. 
Another driver was the feeling that, for companies that were prepared to push the 
envelope that would give them a competitive advantage. Our American friends are 
very good at pushing the envelope. It’s no coincidence that most large US 
multinationals have effective tax ratios which are significantly lower than 
European multinationals. The US system was set up in such a way that some, not 
all, of its MNE do get a big competitive advantage, despite its high nominal rate 
of corporate income tax.  
 
So what is the BEPS project trying to achieve? There are three broad objectives 
that are set for BEPS. One is to get a fairer sharing of the tax base between 
countries. The second is the counteraction of non-compliance, particularly by 
means of MNEs using tax havens. And the third is to update the rules of the game 
that the OECD has been working on for the last 50 years. The 15 Action points 
can be conveniently grouped into three groupings. There are those that are 
primarily concerned with transparency: the disclosure provisions, the country-by-
country reporting, even the master file of transfer pricing. There are those that 
look at substance: this whole idea that, if a tax scheme doesn’t have substance 
behind it, then somewhere something’s gone wrong. And substance is not having 
one highly-paid lawyer with a lovely sun tan in a Caribbean island, sitting behind 
600 brass plates. So there’s a whole debate going on of what do we mean by 
substance? And that’s not going to be easy – as you can see from the CFC 
discussion draft. And then, the third theme that runs through the whole 
programme is coherence. We need a greater coherence in the way that different 
parts of the international tax system interact. 
 
In terms of what has been achieved so far, my ex-colleagues in the OECD, have 
managed to deliver on time high quality technical products. Seven of the Action 
plans resulted in recommendations to the G20 heads of government when they 
met in Brisbane in 2014, although many were what I call, “qualified”. There was 
no clear consensus saying “this is what must be done”; it was more analysis and 
then options about each issue. The remaining eight Action points are to be 
delivered by November 2015. This is the point where the rubber hits the road, 
because up until now BEPS has been about analysing problems, putting forward 
options; now they’re going to have to say “hey, this is what you heads of 
government have to agree to do”. And that’s where it gets difficult. And it partly 
gets difficult because different countries have gone into the project with different 
objectives. The BRICS were entering the project primarily because they saw it as 
an opportunity for revising the international rules of the game, particularly the 
division of tax between source and residence countries. The US and some other 
big countries went into the project primarily because they were tired with the way 
their multinationals were using tax havens to minimize their tax burden. Countries 
like France and Italy were more concerned with digitalization. So lots of different 
objectives, which meant it was going to be difficult to get a consensus on the 15 
Action points.  
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BEPS is not going to finish in November 2015 at the Turkish summit. This is just 
going to be another staging point in the process. After November 2015, there’ll be 
much more emphasis on implementation, and much more emphasis on the tax 
administration aspect, which brings it back to the type of work that is being done 
at TARC. This is a project that is worthwhile looking at on a longer-term basis. 
The other comment is if governments were primarily interested in more money, 
they’ve chosen the wrong tax. In a typical OECD country, the corporate income 
tax yield is about eight per cent of total tax revenue, with about 70 per cent of the 
revenue coming from multinationals and of that 70 per cent, maybe a third 
potentially related to Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. So even if BEPS is fully 
successful, maybe it’s a one or two per cent increase in overall taxes. Now look at 
VAT: 20 per cent; tax gap 15 per cent. So maybe what we need is a BEPS VAT 
programme the next time round.  
 
In developing countries, the reliance on corporate income taxes tends to be much 
higher; 18 to 25 per cent. But a lot of the issues that are coming out of the BEPS 
project may not be a priority for developing countries. For developing countries, 
the priority has to be improving the capacity of tax administrations. If you do not 
have a good tax administration, there is little you can do about BEPS.    
 
Exchange of Information 
 
The other change that has occurred is the whole question of exchange of 
information. And it’s rare in the tax world that you have a revolution, but I think 
this is one example where there is a revolution. I spent 20 years of my life trying 
to get countries to agree to give up their bank secrecy. Look now at the change. 
Ministers in Switzerland saying, “we will now move into the automatic exchange 
of information scheme”.  I haven’t heard a finance minister stand up recently and 
say, “we defend bank secrecy as the barrier to effective exchange of information”. 
And that is one of the legacies that former UK Primer Minister Gordon Brown can 
be proud of, because without him and his pushing at the April 2009 G20 Summit, 
we wouldn’t be where we are. So we have seen a revolution in terms of exchange 
of information (EOI) on request. And keep in mind that for tax administration, 
information is the life blood. Deny a tax administration access to information, and 
it can’t operate effectively. We have now got that in place – and it’s beginning to 
work.  
 
But what is interesting from my perspective is that, despite not having completed 
the EOI on request process, the G20 have now said the new standard is going to 
be automatic exchange of information. You want to have all forms of exchange of 
information on the table: spontaneous, automatic and on request. It is much more 
challenging, the automatic exchange. And if you don’t believe that, ask the EU 
countries how long it took them to implement the savings directive. Ireland, a 
pretty sophisticated tax administration: five years. It’s a big investment for a tax 
administration. The EU now said that once all this is operational, the savings 
directive will disappear. Because that’s what you want; because you need to work 
towards global standards; because without the global standards, you can’t take 
advantage of the technology that’s coming in place to minimize the compliance 
costs to the taxpayers, and to maximize the usefulness of the information for tax 
administrations. So, there’s a big challenge there.  
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Once we’ve gone through this process of increased cooperation between tax 
administrations on the assessment side, the elephant in the room then is what do 
we do about collection? Because very few countries are prepared to help other 
countries claim tax. And the amount of tax debt: at one point I think the OECD 
estimated it at somewhere at 450-500 billion dollars’ worth of uncollected tax. 
And that’s just in the OECD area. You extrapolate that to developing countries, 
it’s probably a multiple of that figure. So it’s great having assistance in 
assessment, but can we move to the next stage of assistance in collection? And 
there is now a provision, Article 27 in the OECD model for that. But let’s put it 
this way, there’s not much enthusiasm on the part of countries to move in that 
direction, because they are still in the old world of national sovereignty, and that’s 
something I will come to. 
 
Country by country reporting and other reports 
 
The other issue that is a BEPS-related issue but I wanted to pick out is the 
question of country-by-country reporting. Again, that was a concept that we 
launched at the OECD in 2010. We did a feasibility report. It was a great report. It 
began by analysing what the issue was. It then looked at what were the options 
and what were the consequences. And it made recommendations. It was so good a 
report that the OECD refused to publish it. But we managed to get Mike 
Devereux, Director of the Oxford Centre for Business Taxation to publish it, 
without any reference to the OECD. That really kicked the debate off, and it was 
part of a response to the tax campaigning non-government organisations (NGOs). 
Eventually it came back on the agenda of the G20 and now it’s a reality. A lot of 
companies refuse to recognize that, but I say to them, “look you have to start 
preparing for country-by-country reporting”. It means that multinationals will 
have to provide a lot more information to the tax administrations in which they 
operate, and it’s got to be done.  
 
This was the most contested part of the BEPS project. There were a lot of 
multinationals that really didn’t want it. Why didn’t they want to do this? They 
said, “we don’t have the information”. It is a little bit difficult building up the 
picture for the legal entities, but it’s not impossible.  There is a compliance cost, 
but that’s inevitable when you change some of the rules. The one area where I do 
share some of their concerns is on the confidentiality issues, although a lot of this 
information I don’t think is commercially sensitive. But I can see that they are 
concerned about the potential for the information to be misused; there is also 
concern that this is a first step away from the arms’ length principle towards 
global formulary re-apportionment. The OECD has tried to address this by saying 
the information would only be given to tax administrations. Let’s get real. When 
the review is undertaken in 2020, what’s the first thing they’re going to decide? 
The information has to go public. So I say to multinationals, “if you’re preparing 
this information, prepare it on the basis that everything you put there is going to 
get in the public domain.” And maybe that’s not a bad thing. If we want sensible 
debate on tax policy, the citizens need information. And yes, it’s complicated, but 
you need to then explain it; that’s the role of politicians and it’s the role of tax 
advisors as well. It’s going to be an interesting debate. 
 
Journal of Tax Administration Vol 1:2 2015                               Tax Transparency and BEPS 
 
11 
 
There is a risk that the information will be misused, particularly by non-OECD 
countries, to adopt the more aggressive approach; one that is more based on 
profit-split, more based perhaps on some sort of transitional pre-decided 
formulary re-apportionment as well. But in many ways, I think, that’s a healthy 
debate to have. It does mean that you have information in the public domain, and 
that is only to the good. Better transparency is the first step towards getting that 
trust into the system.  
 
The one thing that may be a mistake is that the information on the country-by-
country reporting will be exchanged via the treaty network. It’s cumbersome; it’s 
not in real time; and it’s going to effectively exclude many developing countries.  
There is another way it can be done, and that is to put the information into the 
cloud. Registered multinationals and registered tax authorities would have access 
to the cloud. Are there more confidentiality risks in that? No. confidentiality 
issues remain the same. What new technology people tell me is actually it’s 
probably more secure. We had a meeting in Vienna in April 2015 with a mix of 
service providers, businesses, tax administrations, academics and government – 
and that was the conclusion they came to. Or as somebody suggested, why do we 
need to have all of these different pipelines? Why can’t tax administrations just 
have direct access into the accounts of multinationals? Revolutionary idea! Think 
how easy that would be.  And who owns the data of the multinationals? Such an 
approach would minimize compliance costs.  
 
Now let’s go to the Master File. It sounds a very Orwellian concept, the Master 
File, but it is actually quite a useful concept because it really sets out what type of 
information should be provided by multinationals to tax administrations.  This 
information will be provided by subsidiaries to the tax administrations within 
which they operate. There’s not much new that’s here, but I think what is 
interesting is it’s in a standard format. The idea was to combine country-by-
country reporting with Master File. That was split. Why? Because of the concerns 
about formulary re-apportionment. So if you put all this together: a combination 
of country-by-country reporting, the Master Files, Exchange of Information – the 
tax administrations are going to have much more information than in the past for 
transfer pricing and that can only be a force for good.  
 
Impact for Tax Administrations 
 
Technology: I won’t spend very much time on this, but if you want to be serious 
about a tax administration reform, you need to get into the technology. 
Commissioners are scared when it comes to technology, because they know it 
costs a lot of money and, once you make the decision and invest the funds, you 
are blocked. The US Internal Revenue Service has one of the poorest technology 
systems in the world and it is very hard to change because of the legacy issues 
there are. So you’ve got to get it right. And every day you get proposals coming 
across the Commissioner’s desk: “why don’t you do this?” and “why don’t you do 
that?” How do they choose? Some administrations have begun appointing data 
analyst advisors; not tax people. But I think there is an enormous potential for 
technology to change the way that tax administrations work. And as I said, if you 
look at putting country-by-country reporting in the cloud, you’ve got a really 
effective tool. And it is not just using technology to get the information, it’s using 
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technology to analyse the information – big data. Because all of that – the 
combination of better access to information, a better capacity to analyse the 
information, using big data – what do you get? Better risk assessment and better 
risk management. So you move away from a blanket audit approach to one that is 
much more selective. Developing countries can benefit significantly from such an 
approach.  
 
How do governments and business take advantage of this more open, more 
transparent environment? To me, the key is for government to think very carefully 
how they exploit all the information. For tax administrations and for business the 
key message is the old days of deals being done in the back room have gone. If 
you’re a big multinational, you have to now see that any information that you give 
to one tax administration is going to get around the world. So the days when you 
could play off the UK against the US by giving one set of information to one 
country and another to another have gone. And the implication is that 
multinationals are going to have to have a much more globally consistent 
approach to information sharing and compliance. And some MNEs are appointing 
a global tax policy officer – not a bean counter, but somebody that actually takes a 
global view: “what are we doing in terms of our approach to tax planning on a 
global basis?” So, lots of interesting things happening there.  
 
Let’s move to ask what sort of vision we could form in terms of where tax 
administrations will be by 2030. We will continue to see a tendency to strip out 
the policy function from tax administrations, so that they do focus on 
implementation, although the borderline between tax administration and policy is 
fluid. We will see tax administrations that are leaner, meaner and smaller: and yet, 
they will be asked to do more things – more things that are not linked with 
revenue collection. The way they’ll resolve this conflict is by using technology. 
And perhaps that’s not a bad thing, the fact that there is some shrinking of some 
of the bigger tax administrations. So, we will see a lot of the assessment functions 
outsourced. In other words, you will be using third-party intermediaries not just to 
collect the tax, but also to assess the tax. Russia is quite a good example of that. 
You’ll see more use of withholding taxes. We will see more countries moving into 
the cooperative compliance space, because that is the answer to a lot of the issues 
that we face today. There’ll be more emphasis on protection rather than detection; 
or, put another way, a lot of the issues that arise in a debate between the tax 
administration and a company, there’ll be a real effort made to resolve these 
before you get into the audit – the compliance assurance programme (CAP) in the 
US, for example. And that has advantages for tax administrations and for the 
taxpayer. We’ll continue to see the spread of special units. Most countries now 
have large business units; many – not enough in my view- have high net wealth 
individuals, while some countries have SME units. And of course, countries that 
are rich in natural resources have units that specialize just in the extractive 
industries. That’s a good thing because it builds up expertise of the tax 
administration.  
 
We will see a more sophisticated approach to risk management. 25 or 30 years 
ago, the attitude of most tax administrations was to audit. (50 per cent of 
enterprises was not uncommon). The typical audit rate in OECD countries today 
is less than two per cent. You say, “how can we do that”? You can do it if you get 
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good risk management. And we need to get the developing countries into this 
mentality, because they waste a lot of resources at the moment.   
  
Another point is that we see a new emphasis on the work being done by 
behavioural scientists, tax psychologists, tax sociologist on how to influence 
attitudes towards compliance.  And I am glad to see that’s something that you’re 
working on here at TARC. I also think that, with all the information technology 
that we have and all the additional information that tax administrations will get, 
particularly from third parties, that we’ll see a massive move towards pre-
populated tax returns. Ten years ago it was only the Nordics that had this in place; 
today there are a few more countries, but there are still too many OECD countries 
that don’t – the US, for example. I think one of the reasons in the US is that you 
have 460,000 tax assessors that will basically lose their jobs. That’s a pretty 
powerful lobby. But we will get there so that paying your tax becomes almost a 
pleasure! You get your tax return from the tax administration, it is all completed, 
you look through it, the information is right, you then tick it and automatically the 
amount is deducted from your bank account. It works in Norway: 90 per cent of 
the returns that are dealt with in this way are correct, and 90 per cent end up by 
paying the tax automatically. It is a painless system. Now, if you believe in the 
small government, you may not like that. As Milton Friedman once said to me, “I 
like to make tax as painful as possible.” Not sure it’s the right way to approach it, 
but that’s the US. We will see a greater integration of audit of VAT and of 
corporate income taxes. Some countries have got there already, like Australia; but 
many countries still have separate reporting, even when you have large business 
units. But if you think about it, the information you need for a VAT audit is 
extremely similar to the information that you need for a corporate tax audit.  
 
You will also see the move from bilateral to multilateral approaches. You’ll see 
this in audits already. You’ve got a number of countries undertaking multilateral 
simultaneous audits, multilateral joint audits and I hope, we will see the same in a 
dvance pricing agreements (APAs). I’ve never liked unilateral APAs. If you can’t 
tell your treaty partner what you’ve done in the APA, there is something wrong 
with it. So I like the idea that more countries are moving to the bilateral APAs; the 
next move is multilateral. There are one of two companies and one or two 
countries that have begun that process. It’s not easy, but it can be done, and it is a 
more effective way, both from the perspective of the tax administrator and the 
perspective of the company. This move to multilateralism is spear headed by the 
OECD multilateral convention on administrative assistance in tax matters. It has 
something like 80+ signatures now. It is a massive change.  
 
I also hope we will see a move towards tax arbitration. I do not understand why 
tax people are so against – well, I do – mandatory arbitration. Why is it that the 
investment people can go in that direction? Why do the financial people go in that 
direction? Free Trade Agreements including the proposal between Europe and US 
have dispute resolution mechanisms. The WTO has done it. And we the tax 
people, it’s not our culture. So what do you get? Unresolved tax disputes. The 
UK/US Glaxo Smith case that took fifteen years to get a solution. In a post-BEPS 
environment we will need a guaranteed outcome. But in mutual agreement 
procedures, there is no obligation on the tax administration for a final agreement; 
it’s just to try their best endeavour. That’s not enough today. And that’s why, at 
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Vienna, one of the things I’ve launched is a project on the tax disputes.   The 
report the OECD put out in their Discussion Draft on Action 14 threw down the 
glove. It was giving up too easily under pressure from the BRICS. We need to 
move forward on that since BEPS, at least in the transitional period, is going to 
generate a tsunami of tax disputes. 
 
So overall, what are we going to see in ten years’ time? We will see tax 
administrations that are smaller; that are much more comfortable using new 
technologies to deliver service, to deliver enforcement; that interact with the treaty 
partners much more effectively; that interact with other government law 
enforcement agencies – financial intelligence units, justice departments – to 
counter all forms of illicit activities; and that have much greater commercial 
awareness of what’s happening in the private sector. You will find that 
multinationals will, slowly, perhaps painfully, get used to operating in a much 
more transparent environment. What I predict is that in ten years’ time, when we 
look back at this debate we will say: “Country-by-Country, what was all the fuss 
about? What was it all about?” Information sharing.          
 
